The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) on Thursday asked the Federal Capital Territory High Court in Maitama, Abuja, to dismiss the N5 billion defamation suit filed against it by two officials of the Department of State Services (DSS).
Adopting its final written address before Justice Yusuf Halilu, SERAP argued that the claimants failed to establish that the allegedly defamatory publication referred to them personally.
The claimants, Sarah John and Gabriel Ogundele, instituted the suit marked FCT/HC/CV/4547/24 against SERAP and its Deputy Director, Kolawole Oluwadare. They are seeking N5 billion in damages, N50 million in legal costs, a public apology to be published on SERAP’s website and in national newspapers and broadcast on television stations, as well as 10 per cent annual interest on the judgment sum until fully paid.
They alleged that SERAP falsely claimed that DSS operatives invaded its Abuja office in September 2024, an assertion they said damaged their reputations and that of the agency.
Counsel to SERAP, Victoria Bassey, urged the court to dismiss the suit, arguing that the publication complained of did not mention the claimants by name, rank or any identifiable personal details.
Citing Supreme Court authorities, she submitted that where a plaintiff is not expressly named in a defamatory publication, the burden is on them to prove that reasonable persons understood the words to refer to them.
“The publications referred generally to DSS. They did not mention the claimants’ names, ranks or units. DSS is a national security agency with thousands of officers. Words directed at such a broad institutional body cannot automatically translate into personal defamation,” she argued.
Counsel to the second defendant, Oluwatosin Adesioye, also adopted his final written address and described the suit as “offensive,” urging the court to dismiss it in its entirety.
He argued that although a plaintiff need not always be named, they must plead and prove special circumstances showing how the publication could reasonably be linked to them.
According to him, the claimants failed to establish such circumstances. He further contended that evidence presented showed that the publication was only connected to the claimants after institutional information was provided, which, he argued, falls outside the test for defamation.
“The principle is what an ordinary reader would understand at the time of reading the publication, not after being supplied with additional facts,” he submitted.
Counsel to the claimants, Akinlolu Kehinde (SAN), urged the court to grant all the reliefs sought, adopting their final written address dated January 30, 2026.
On the procedural issue, he argued that the second defendant’s written address exceeded the 10-page limit prescribed under Order 39 Rule 2 of the court’s rules and should therefore be discontinued.
On the substantive issue, Kehinde maintained that the publication referred to his clients, relying on the principle of innuendo in defamation law.
“The narrow issue is whether the defamatory material referred to the claimants. Where persons with contextual or background facts can identify that the publication refers to the claimants, the requirement is satisfied,” he argued.
In response, the second defendant’s counsel contended that the rules did not prescribe a specific sanction for exceeding page limits and urged the court to prioritize substantial justice over technicalities. He also pointed out that the claimants’ own final address exceeded the permissible page limit.
In his remarks, Justice Halilu reminded counsel that final written addresses cannot substitute for evidence.
“Addresses are meant to provide a comprehensive understanding of the law, garnished with evidence before the court. The most important thing remains the evidence,” he said.
The judge subsequently reserved judgment in the matter.
